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BOOK REVIEWS
By William L. Cary. New
York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1967. Pp. 149. $5.95.
POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES.

In this volume of modest size, embodying his 1966 Cooley Lectures
at the University of Michigan, the author has made important use of his
observations and experience as chairman of the Federal Securities and
Exchange Commission from early 1961 until his resignation three and
one half years later to return to law teaching. In addition, the book's
mature wisdom and resolute avoidance of generalizations transcending the
available data contribute to a discussion that is realistic and filled with
significant insights. Much of what is written here applies to the operations of federal administrative agencies generally and not merely to the
so-called independent regulatory bodies with which the text is primarily
concerned.
Although the book ends with a chapter of Generalizations and
Conclusions, these are far from dogmatic. The net effect of the author's
treatment is to exclude any rigid conceptual scheme surrounding the
operations of agencies and their external relations. Thus he remarks that
independent regulatory agencies carry on important functions but "have
a relatively limited role";' that rule-making ought to be used more than
it is in the development of agency policy,2 but adjudication provides a
better tool in some situations ;3 and that the independence of the "independent" agencies is only partial, even a "myth," but has enough substance
and confers enough benefit to warrant retention of this type of governmental unit.4 As respects executive control over the agencies, both the
position that it should be thorough-going and the view that there is no
place for it are unacceptable; Cary, by contrast, finds it "impossible to
arrive at any absolute formula" to embrace the varying situations that
arise.'
Government regulation of economic activity, through whatever kinds
of agencies it may be undertaken, must go forward in a stream of powerful forces impeded by rocks of resistance. For the administrator to seek
quiet back-waters removed from eddying currents or sheltered from the
public gaze is to yield the central purpose; to be driven by a momentarily
1. W. CARY, POLITICS AND TME REGULATORY AGENCIES 125 (1967).
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

84.
82-84, 131.
135-139.
20.
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impelling thrust is to run the risk of foundering on an immovable rock.
All about are threatening snags and predatory creatures, as well as
potential aid from friendly folk, some of whom took part in launching the
regulatory craft. The craft itself is no simple, inert vessel like a raft, but
rather a complex Maid of the Mist with interrelated parts and a driving
force of its own. To navigate it successfully under all these conditions
requires knowledge, skill, and determination of a high order.
The focus of Professor Cary's discussion is on the task of agency
skippers in the complex, changing circumstances of voyages in political
and economic waters. The governing policies prescribed by statute must
be pursued with the means provided, which are adaptable and fairly
numerous, and with the assistance that can be marshaled. It is idle to
suppose that the legislature which originally charted the trip either was or
remains unified and constant in support of it. It is equally fatuous to
believe that any part of the executive establishment, from the President
at its head to its component staff members and bureaus, does or could
comprehend fully the specific regulatory enterprise; for they must be
concerned with other, more pressing matters.' Yet Congress and the
President have a legitimate, continuing concern with the impact of the
agency's acts upon matters of central governmental importance; each must
play a role in providing funds, selecting agency personnel, considering
supplemental legislation, and engaging in over-all criticism and surveillance of government operations. The affected business interests may be
numerous, changing, and different from each other, rather than united
and constant, but their power is great. In the total scene the agency has
an assured place, albeit only a precarious effectiveness. Each move it
makes is likely to arouse opposition that threatens its appropriation, the
scope of its powers, or the continuance of its personnel.
The author deals with agency operations, especially policy-making,
in the foregoing context, supplying numerous illustrations from the
experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission and other
agencies. He carries the subject through the legislative process as experienced by the Commission in securing the passage of the Securities Act
Amendments of 1964,' as well as into the area of relations with the
White House. As to the latter, a series of experiences of the SEC,'
the problem of the FCC in launching its broad American Telephone
and Telegraph Company investigation in 1965,' and the difficulties
6. "In fact, government regulatory agencies are stepchildren whose custody is
contested by both the Congress and the Executive, but without very much affection
from either one." Id. 4.
7. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
S. W. CARY, supra note 1, at 13-19.
9. Id. 23-25.
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surrounding controversial appointments and reappointments of commissioners and board members"0 are summarized. Many aspects of agency
relations with Congress, involving reorganizations, appropriations, pressures from private interests, and resistance to new agency regulations
(as illustrated by experiences of the FCC and FTC) are covered
in Chapter 2.
Professor Cary sets forth some cogent observations about recurring
aspects of agency operations. He concludes that "no major step forward
can be achieved by an old-line regulatory agency in the absence of support
from some of the leaders of the industry it regulates."" He also takes
the view that for the members of at least the Securities and Exchange
Commission to become individually responsible for writing opinions in all
formal adjudication carried on by the Commission itself, without the aid
of an opinion-writing staff, would be to run the risk of undue diversion
of time from essential policy-making tasks." He believes the boards and
commissions should be small, with not more than five members, and
should resort to delegation to keep down the burden of work.13 He
emphasizes that for a variety of reasons it would be a mistake to transfer
the adjudicatory functions of most agencies to separate adjudicating
bodies.' 4
Divestiture of the adjudicatory function of an agency would leave an
administrator or commission charged with responsibility for carrying
out the governing statute by the process, among others, of bringing
proceedings before the adjudicating body. In these proceedings, Professor
Cary points out, the initiating authority "could only hope to persuade
an administrative court that on the basis of experience the court had not
shared" particular decisions were called for. Here lies the principal reason
for retaining in the unified agency one of the principal means of dealing
with developing problems. In its absence there would be greater difficulty
than now in securing competent, dedicated leadership for agencies which
are supposed to shape their actions and secure results by close contact
with the problems confronting them.
One naturally asks whether there is hope that the regulatory agencies,
especially the so-called "independent" ones, can continue to command the
needed personnel and otherwise to carry on successfully under the conditions Professor Cary describes. He gives much thought to this problem. A
great deal depends on circumstances, especially the extent of the challenge
10. Id. 61-66.
11. Id. 69.
12. Id. 85.
13. Id. 134-135.

14. Id. 125-134.
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involved in particular regulatory tasks. As has often been observed, new
agencies are more likely than old ones to undertake their responsibilities
with vigor and imagination. Professor Cary devotes much of his attention
to the question whether "old-line" agencies can retain or regain these
qualities. The SEC, which underwent something of a renaissance with
Professor Cary as chairman during the Kennedy and early Johnson
administrations, had not slumped as badly as some other agencies during
the preceding period, as Professor Cary is quick to recognize. There were,
moreover, certain favorable economic and political factors at work in
relation to its tasks, notably the importance of reliable securities markets
to private enterprise. Therefore the experience of the SEC is not
necessarily a guide to other situations. The different circumstances
surrounding other agencies can, however, be translated into more effective
action in varying ways, as Professor Cary illustrates by reference to the
contrasting methods of the FPC and FCC at critical periods."
What cannot be dispensed with is dedication and resourcefulness on the
part of both the staffs and the directing personnel. The infusion of these
depends on many factors, cultural, political, and economic; but in the
context of American life today the task is not hopeless, as this book
demonstrates." Better long-run alternatives to the processes here described have yet to be found.
RALPH F. FucHst

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND

JUSTICE.

By Julius Stone. Stanford:

Stanford University Press. 1966. Pp. xxxv, 933. $18.50.
In reading for review Julius Stone's serious work of monumental
scholarship and erudition, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, two
images came to characterize my initial irreverent and perhaps flippant
reaction.
The first derives from a short story, "The Library of Babel" by the
Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges. His story concerns a vast library,
no two books of which are identical. The physically uniform volumes of
this library contain, altogether, all the possible combinations of the
15. A device that can be used recurringly is critical self-study and analysis of
problems confronting an agency, often with the aid of independent experts, which the
S.E.C. used effectively, under an authorization by Congress, in its special study of the
Securities Markets in 1961-63. Id. 70-79.
16. There is a discussion of methods for attracting personnel of the needed
quality. Id. 86-88.
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